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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
INTERMOUNTAIN REAL PROPERTIES, 
LLC., an Idaho limited liability company, 
as assignee ofTMC CONTRACTORS, 
INC., 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
KEVIN TAGGART, an Individual, CAMDEN 
COURT, LLC, an Idaho limited liability 
company, DRAW, LLC.,an Idaho limited 
liability company, TIMBERLINE 
PROPERTIES, LLC., an Idaho limited liability 
company, AARON DEAN EDDINGTON, an 
Individual, CITIZENS COMMUNITY BANK, 
and ALL OTHER PERSON UNKNO\VN 
CLAIMING INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT 
PROPERTY, 
Defendants. 
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RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District 
for the State ofIdaho for Bingham County. 
Honorable Darren B. Simpson, District Judge, Presiding. 
For Plaintiff/Appellant: 
Kipp L. Manwaring 
Manwaring Law Office, P.A. 
381 Shoup Ave., Ste 210 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
For Defendant'Respondent: 
J. Michael \\'heiler 
Richard R. Friess 
Thomsen Stephens Law Offices, PLLC 
2635 Channing Way 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
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IV 
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
Defendant/Respondent Draw, LLC ("Draw") agrees with Plaintiff/Appellant Intermountain 
Real Properties, LLC ("Intermountain") statement regarding the nature of the case with the following 
exceptions: 
Intermountain states that Draw owned real property within the Taylorview Development. 
It is disputed that Draw's real property was within the Taylorview Development. Intermountain also 
states that the district court determined that Draw's property was not within T aylorview 
Development. While this statement is accurate, the district court also analyzed this case with the 
assumption that Draw's property was actually within Taylorview Development. The district court 
still found no genuine issue of material fact existed even if it was assumed that Draw's property was 
actually within Taylorview Development. 
B. Course of Proceedings Below. 
Draw largely agrees with Intermountain's statement regarding the course of proceedings 
below. However, it should be noted that TMC's original Complaint filed on July 23,2009 was not 
solely for foreclosure of a materialman's lien. TMC's Complaint also contained claims for "Debt 
Due Under Open Account and for Lien Foreclosure," breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and 
quantum meruit. R. Vol. I, p. 16 - 29. It should also be noted that Intermountain's Amended 
Complaint filed on August 7, 2009 contained claims in the following order: Count 1- Breach of 
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Contract, Count Two - Open Account, Count Three - Unjust Enrichment, and Count Four - Lien 
Foreclosure. R. Vol. I, p. 37-54. 
C. Statement of Facts. 
1. Shawn Allen sold lots located in Shelley, Bingham County, Idaho, to Kevin Taggart 
and Timberline, LLC. R. Vol. I, p. 138. Timberline was owned by Kevin Taggart. Order Granting 
Motion to Augment, Doc. 3, p. 2, para. 1. 
I Subsequently, on or about December 21, 2007, Draw purchased an unimproved lot 
in Shelley, Bingham County, Idaho, from Timberline Properties, LLC. R. VoL I, p. 227; Order 
Granting Motion to Augment, Doc. 1, p. 2, para. 2. 
3. In April of 2008, defendant Kevin Taggart entered into a contract with TMC 
Contractors to pave a driveway/parking lot in a development in Shelley, Bingham County, Idaho. 
Order Granting Jvlotion to Augment, Doc. 3, p. 2, para. 2; R. VoL I, p. 36. 
4. The Proposal and Contract from TMC for the paving work indicates it was sent to 
Kevin Taggart, Century 21 Advantage, 170 W. Main St., Rigby, ID 83442, Attn: Kevin Taggart 529-
1750 Fax, 745-5221. It was signed as "Accepted By" by Kevin Taggart. R. VoL I, p. 36. 
5. In October, 2008, TMC performed the paving work and sent Kevin Taggart an invoice 
for the amount due. R. Vol. I, p. 30 and 53. 
6. Draw was not a party to or involved with the TMC contract in any way and only 
became aware that the parking lot/driveway was being paved after it was completed. Order 
Granting Motion to Augment, Doc. 1, p. 2, para. 6; Doc. 2, p. 2, para. 6; Doc. 3, p. 2, para. 3. Kevin 
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Taggart has never had an ownership interest in Draw and was not Draw's agent. Order Granting 
Motion to Augment, Doc. 1, p. 3, para. 12; Doc. 3, p. 2, para. 3-4. 
7. Draw only became aware of the existence of the TMC paving contract when it was 
served with the Complaint in this matter. Order Granting Motion to Augment, Doc. L p. 2, para. 
6; Doc. 2, p. 2, para. 6. 
8. Draw's property was and is vacant, unimproved land. Order Granting Motion to 
Augment, Doc. 1, p. 3, para. 13; Doc. 3, p. 2, para. 3. Prior to TMC paving the parking lot/driveway 
for Kevin Taggart, Draw had and continues to have access to its property by way of a separate gravel 
road. Order Granting Motion to Augment, Doc. 1, p. 2. para. 5; Doc. 2, p. 2, para. 5; Doc. 3, p. 2, 
para. 3; Doc. 9, p. 2, para. 4, p. 3, para. 7-8. 
II. ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Did Appellant Intermoutain Real Properties, LLC waive its contention that the 
district court failed to apply t.l-te language of I.e. § 45-501. 
2. Is Apellant Intermountain Real Properties, LLC entitled to attorney fees on appeal? 
3. Is Respondent Draw, LLC entitled to attorney fees on appeal under I.C. § 12-120(3)? 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. APPELLANT INTERMOUNTAIN REAL PROPERTIES, LLC, WAIVED ITS 
CONTENTION THAT THE DISTRICT COURT FAILED TO APPLY THE 
LANGUAGE OF I.e. § 45-501. 
Intermountain lists in its "Issues Presented on Appeal" section the following two errors it 
claims the district court allegedly made: 
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1. Did u~e district court err in disregarding the positive testimony found in the 
affidavit of Robert Butler proving Draw's real property was within 
Taylorview Development? 
2. Did the district court err as a matter of law in awarding Draw some of its 
attorney fees based upon I.C. § 12-120(3) finding there was a commercial 
transaction between TM C and Draw? 
Appellant's Brief, p. 5. 
However, in the body of its briefIntermountain also contends that the district court "failed 
to apply the clear language of § 45-501." Appellant's Brief, p. 7. Intermountain failed to include 
this as an issue in the statement of issues as required by LA.R. 35(a)(4), which states: 
the brief of appellant shall contain: ... (4) ... A list of the issues presented on 
appeal, expressed in the terms and circumstances of the case but without unnecessary 
detail. The statement of the issues should be short and concise, and should not be 
repetitious. The issues shall fairly state the issues presented for review. The statement 
of the issues presented will be deemed to include every subsidiary issue fairly 
comprised therein. 
LA.R. 35(a)(4). 
"F ailure of the appellant to include an issue in the statement of issues required by LA.R. 
35(a)(4) will eliminate consideration ofthat issue on appeaL" Kugler v. Drown, 119 Idaho 687, 691 
(Ct. App. 1991). 
This error omitted from Intermountain's "Issues Presented on Appeal" cannot be considered 
a subsidiary issue fairly comprised within the issue of whether the district court disregarded the 
positive testimony of Robert Butler, The two issues are separate and distinct. The failure to apply 
the language of a statute concerns the interpretation and application of a statute to established facts. 
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Conversely, disregarding affidavit testimony is an evidentiary issue. 
Pursuant to I.A.R. 3 5( a)( 4) and Idaho case law, this Court should find that Intermountain has 
waived the issue as to whether the district court failed to apply the language of I.C. § 45-501. 
However, in the event this Court fails to find that Intermountain has waived this issue, Draw has 
addressed this alleged error in Section III. Part B-2 below. 
B. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT DISREGARD THE TESTIMONY OF 
ROBERT BUTLER THAT DRAW'S PROPERTY WAS WITHIN TA YLORVIEW 
DEVELOPMENT. 
Intermountain contends the district court made two errors not related to attorney fees. First, 
that on Intermountain's Motion for Reconsideration, it disregarded positive testimony of Robert 
Butler establishing Draw's parcel as being part of Taylorview Development. Second, it contends 
in the body of its brief that the district court failed to apply the clear language ofLC. § 45-501. The 
district court's decisions were correct in both instances. 
1. The District Court Did Not Disregard the Positive Testimony of Robert 
Butler. 
Intermountain contends that the district court disregarded the affidavit testimony of Robert 
Butler that Draw's parcel was at one time part ofTaylorview Development. Intermountain contends 
that the district court erroneously relied upon the "black lines" on the record of survey and the 
Assessor's plat to reach its determination that Draw's parcel was not located in Taylorview 
Development. Appellant's Brief, p. 9. 
The district court found that "based upon the evidence in the record, at best, a fact issue 
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remains whetherornotDraw's Property lies within the Taylorview Development." R. Vol. l,p. 250. 
However, after making this finding, the district court performed an in depth analysis with the 
assumption that Draw's property was within Taylorview Development. The district court stated the 
following in its Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider: 
Assuming, however, that Draw's Property does lie within Taylorview 
Development, the record does not support a finding that Draw, as an owner of one 
of the Taylorview parcels, consented to the paving or authorized the paving through 
Taggart as Draw's alleged agent. Taggart testified that he entered into the paving 
contract with TMC and that Draw was neither a party to nor involved with the TMC 
paving contract in any way. 
Nothing in the record supports a theory that Draw explicitly granted Taggart authority 
to act in Draw's name. Neither Taggart nor Draw acknowledged any kind of agency 
relationship. Since no evidence of a grant of actual authority is found in the record, 
there is likewise no evidence to support a theory that Taggart had implied authority 
to carry out the purposes of any alleged express authority. 
Furthermore, Intermountain has not produced any facts which, taken as true, amount 
to evidence of apparent authority or agency by estoppel. Intermountain bases its 
agency claim upon the alleged words and conduct of the alleged agent, Taggart, to 
establish the agency between Taggart and Draw. Apparent authority is not based on 
the words and conduct of the principal towards the agent, but on the principal's 
words and conduct toward a third party. Apparent authority cannot arise from the 
acts and statements of the agent alone; it must be based upon the principal's words 
and conduct. Thus, Taggart's words or conduct toward TMC did not amount to 
apparent authority to act on behalf of Draw. Only Draw could establish, by words 
or conduct to TMC, that Taggart was Draw's agent. Nothing in the record indicates 
that Draw had any contact, by words or actions, with TMC. 
R. Vol. I, p. 250-51 (emphasis added). 
The district court concluded, stating: 
Draw ovvns a parcel of real estate contiguous to the paved road, whether that parcel 
lies within or outside of the Taylorview Development. The pavement does not 
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extend on to Draw's parcel. Draw has easement rights over the paved road. The 
record does not establish that Draw contracted with TMC to have the road paved, or 
agreed to the paving of the road. The record does not establish that Draw authorized 
Taggart to act on Draw's behalf, or that Draw's words or conduct toward TMC 
established Taggart as Draw's agent. 
R. Vol. I, p. 251 (emphasis added). 
It is undeniable that the district court did not disregard Robert Butler's testimony but 
analyzed the facts assuming that Draw's parcel was within the original Taylorview Development. 
However, this assumption did not change the district court's determination that there was no 
evidence that Draw was involved in the paving contract or that there was no evidence of any agency 
relationship between Draw and Taggart related to the paving contract. As discussed below, this lack 
of agency led the district court to grant Draw summary judgment. Whether Draw's property was 
within Taylorview Development or not, the district court's decision was correct and this Court 
should affirm the same. 
2. The District Court Correctly Applied the Plain Language of 1. C. § 45-501. 
Assuming, for purposes of this appeal, that Intermountain did not waive this issue on appeal, 
the district court correctly applied the language ofLC. § 45-501 to the undisputed facts of this case. 
Intermountain appears to believe that if Draw's property was within Taylorview Development, than 
it can establish an agency relationship under I.e. § 45-501 between Draw and Allen and/or Taggart. 
I.e. § 45-501 states in relevant part: 
Right to lien. Every person performing labor upon, or furnishing materials to be used 
in the construction ... or who grades, fills in, levels, surfaces or otherwise improves 
any land, ... has a lien upon the same for the work or labor done or professional 
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services or materials furnished, whether done or furnished at the instance of the 
owner of the building or other improvement or his agent; and every contractor, 
subcontractor, architect, builder or any person having charge of any mining claim, or 
of the construction, alteration or repair, either in whole or in part, of any building or 
other improvement, as aforesaid, shall be held to be the agent of the ovvner for the 
purpose of this chapter: provided, that the lessee or lessees of any mining claim shall 
not be considered as the agent or agents of the owner under the provisions of this 
chapter. 
1. C. § 45-50 l. 
Intermountain focuses on the provision of § 45-501 that states ;'any person having charge of 
... any building or other improvement, as aforesaid, shall be held to be the agent of the owner for 
the purpose of this chapter." Intermountain contends that the district court failed to apply this 
language of § 45-501. 
Intermountain's contention is that Shawn Allen and Kevin Taggart were persons having 
charge of Taylorview Development because, according Allen's affidavit testimony, he was the 
developer, and at one point in time, the owner of Draw's property. Appellant's Brief p. 7-8; R. Vol. 
I, p. 138. According to Intermountain, Allen's testimony "established that the private drive was 
paved at his or Taggart's direction as the developer and O~TIer of the property." Appellant's Brief, 
p.8. 
In other words, Intermountain argues that because Allen or Taggart were former owners of 
Draw's property they were also person's having charge of Draw' s property at the time of the paving. 
Consequently, the district court should have held them to be Draw's agent solely by virtue of the 
"person having charge" language of1.C. § 45-501. Intermountain contends that the district court did 
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not consider the "person having charge" aspect of the statute because it held that Draw's parcel was 
not within Taylorview Development. 
Intermountain's contention is without merit. I.C. § 4S-S01 requires that the work be "done 
or furnished at the instance of the owner of the building or other improvement or his agent." 
(Emphasis added). Contrary to Intermountain's contention, it is undisputed that Allen and Taggart 
had no ownership interest or authority over Draw's unimproved property at the time of the paving. 
Therefore, Allen's testimony could not establish "that the private drive was paved at [Allen's] or 
Taggart's direction as the developer and owner of the property" or that Allen and Taggart were 
"person[' s] having charge" of Draw's property. 
Since Allen and Taggart were not the owners of Draw's unimproved property at the time of 
paving, they could not be persons having charge of Draw's property unless Draw gave them agency 
and authority over the property. Idaho Code§ 45-S0 1 requires the work be "done or furnished at the 
instance of the owner ... or his agent." The district court applied this language ofLC. § 4S-S01 and 
found that there was no evidence to support that Taggart or Allen had any actual, express, implied, 
or apparent agency authority to act on Draw's behalf. R. Vol. I, p. 2S0-2S1. As quoted above, the 
district court concluded in its Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider: 
Draw o\vns a parcel of real estate contiguous to the paved road, whether that parcel 
lies within or outside of the T aylorview Development. The pavement does not 
extend on to Draw's parcel. Draw has easement rights over the paved road. The 
record does not establish that Draw contracted with TMC to have the road paved, or 
agreed to the paving of the road. The record does not establish that Draw 
authorized Taggart to act on Draw's behalf, or that Draw's words or conduct 
toward TMC established Taggart as Draw's agent. 
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R. Vol. I, p. 251 (emphasis added). 
Thus, the district court applied the plain language ofLC. § 45-501 and found that there was 
no evidence that Allen I or Taggart were Draw's agents at any time after Draw purchased the property 
from Timberline. 2 
The fact that Taggart and Allen were not owners at the time of paving and that there was no 
agency relationship between Draw and Taggart or Allen makes Intermountain's argument that 
Draw's property was within Taylorview Development irrelevant and moot. Without an O\vnership 
interest or agency relationship, Taggart and Allen could not be "person[' s] having charge" of Draw' s 
property. 
Thus, even assuming, as the district court did, that Draw's unimproved property was within 
Taylorview Development, this fact alone does not make Taggart and/or Allen persons having charge 
of Draw's property. To establish that Taggart and/or Allen were persons having charge of Draw's 
property Intermountain must show that Draw gave Taggart and/or Allen charge over its property. 
The district court found no evidence that Draw gave Taggart and/or Allen charge over its property 
I There is no evidence in the record to suggest that Allen was Draw's agent or that Allen 
ever had any contact with Draw. The evidence only shows that Allen had contact with Taggart 
about the paving work. R. Vol. I, p. 139, para. 13. 
2 Intermountain only argues that Allen and Taggart were Draw's agents by virtue of the 
"person having charge" language in I.C. § 45-501. It has not appealed the district court's 
decision that Draw did not give Allen and Taggart agency authority. Thus, the district court's 
determination that Draw did not give Allen and Taggart agency authority is not an issue before 
this Court. 
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or that Taggart and/or Allen were Draw's agent so as to infer any such authority with regard to the 
paving contract. 3 
Intermountain also contends that the district court overlooked Draw's interest in the easement 
to the private road in the development and that the private road was Draw's access to the public 
street. Appellant's Brief, p. 11. The district court considered and addressed the easement in both 
its Order Granting Summary Judgment as to Defendant Draw, LLC (R. Vol. I, p. 193), and its Order 
Denying Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider (R. Vol. I, p. 250). The district court made the following 
determination in its Order Granting Summary Judgment: 
Even if Draw has an easement over Taylorview's driveway, which is not in the 
record, Intermountain points to no law which would require a dominant estate 
owner's payment, save for an express agreement, for the cost of the servient estate 
owner's easement improvements. 
Vol. I, p. 193. 
The district court's determination was correct. This Court has held the following: 
[A ]bsent a showing that the easement owners' maintenance of the easement created 
an additional burden or interference with the servient estate, the servient estate 
cannot dictate the standard by which the easement should be maintained, 
expend funds to maintain it to the level desired by the servient estate and then 
seek reimbursement for those expenditures and contribution for future 
3 There is no evidence in the record to show that Allen was a person having charge of the 
paving. The evidence in the record contradicts any such assertion. It is undisputed that Taggart, 
not Allen, procured the paving estimates and signed the paving contract. R. Vol. I, p. 36, p. 139 
para. 13, and p. 218; Order Granting Motion to Augment, Doc. 3, p. 2, para. 2. Thus, according 
to the evidence in the record, it was Taggart who took charge ofthe paving work - not Mr. Allen 
- and Taggart has admitted that Draw was not a party to or involved with the paving contract in 
any way. Order Granting Motion to Augment, Doc. 3, p. 2, para. 3. 
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expenditures from the easement ov-mers. 
Beckstead v. Price, 146 Idaho 57, 66-67 (2008) (emphasis added) (citing Walker v. Boozer, 140 
Idaho 451, 455, 95 P.3d 69, 73 (2004)). 
In this case, it was the ov.mers of the servient estate who made the decision to pave the 
driveway with no involvement from Draw. As a result, reimbursement for the paving cannot be 
sought or extracted from Draw. 
It is clear that the district court correctly applied the language ofLe. § 45-501. The district 
court's decision concluded that Taggart and/or Allen were not Draw's agents or persons having 
charge of Draw's property. The decision followed the language of § 45-501 that requires the 
improvements be done at the instance of the owner or his agent and should be affirmed. 
C. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRA.NTING DRAW A PART OF 
ITS ATTOR.cl\JEY FEES lJNDER I.C. § 12-120(3). 
Intermountain contends that the district court erred in finding that a commercial transaction 
was the gravamen of Intermountain's complaint because "Draw prevailed at summary judgment in 
showing there was no contract, agreement, or transaction between it and Taggart or Allen." 
Appellant's Brief p. 15. 
The district court did not err in finding that a commercial transaction was the gravamen of 
Intermountain's complaint. The district court stated the following in its Order Granting in Part 
Defendant Draw, LLC's Request for Attorney Fees and Costs: 
Intermountain argues that because there was no privity of contract between TMC (of 
whom Intermountain is the predecessor in interest) and Draw, a commercial 
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transaction is not the gravamen of this issues between Intermountain and Draw. 
Where the action alleged is one to recover in a commercial transaction, the prevailing 
party is entitled to an award of attorney fees under § 12-120(3) regardless of the proof 
that the commercial transaction alleged did, in fact, occur. 
A review of the Amended Complaint reveals Intermountain's allegation that it 
contracted to perform paving work for a commercial development and was not paid 
for its labor and materials. Therefore, it sued the parties allegedly responsible for the 
paving contract for breach of contract, open account, unjust enrichment, and 
foreclosure of its materialman's lien. The gravamen of its lawsuit against the 
defendants was a commercial transaction. Despite this Court's finding the Draw was 
neither a party to, nor responsible for the paving contract, Draw, as the prevailing 
party, is entitled to recover its reasonable attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-
120(3). 
* * * * 
As to Intermountain's contention that its lawsuit is essentially a claim for foreclosure 
of its lien, the i\mended Complaint shows otherwise. Intermountain's first cause of 
action is for breach of contract. Intermountain seeks $23,442.20 in damages for 
breach of the paving contract. Intermountain's second cause of action is to collect 
upon an open account. Intermountain again prays for damages in the amount of 
$23,442.20, together with accruing interest. In its third cause of action, 
Intermountain claims the defendants were unjustly enriched as a result ofthe paving. 
Unjust enrichment is an equitable means of recover where there is no express 
agreement between the parties. Intermountain seeks the same monetary 
compensation for its alternative theory of liability. Finally, in its fourth cause of 
action, Intermountain requests foreclosure of its materialman's lien. 
R. Vol. I, p. 252-53. 
The district court's decision followed Idaho law and rebuts Intermountain's contention that 
because the district court found no transaction between Draw and TMC, Draw should not have been 
awarded attorney fees. Indeed, this Court has previously made clear that 
\\t'here a party alleges the existence of a contractual relationship of a type embraced 
by section 12-120(3) ... that claim triggers the application of [I.C. § 12-120(3)] and 
a prevailing party may recover fees even though no liability under a contract was 
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established. This same principle applies where the action is one to recover in a 
commercial transaction, regardless of the proof that the commercial transaction 
alleged did, in fact, occur. 
Garnerv. Povery, 151 Idaho 462, 469 (2011) (citing Magic Lantern Productions, Inc. v. Dolsot, 126 
Idaho 805, 808 (1995)) (emphasis added). This Court recently reaffirmed this holding in O'Shea v. 
High Mark Dev., LLC, 280 P.3d 146, 160 (2012). 
Thus, the district court's determination that there was no contract, agreement, or transaction 
between Draw and, Taggart, Allen, or TMC does not prevent an award of attorney fees to Draw. The 
gravamen ofInterrnountain's Complaint was the paving services TMC provided and the alleged 
failure of the parties to pay for those services. This undoubtedly qualifies as a commercial 
transaction. Intermountain alleged that Draw was a part of the commercial transaction through an 
agency relationship with Taggart. Therefore Draw is entitled to attorney fees under I.e. § 12-120(3). 
Intermountain cites Hopkins Northwest Fund, LLC v. Landscapes Unlimited, LLC, 151 Idaho 
740 (2011) and BECO Const. Co., Inc. V J-U-B Eng'rs, Inc., 145 Idaho 719 (2008), in support of 
its contention that since the district court found no commercial transaction occurred between the 
parties, then 12-120(3) does not apply. Appellant's Brief, p. 14-15. However, these two cases do 
not support Intermountain's position. 
The complaint in Hopkins did not allege the existence of a commercial transaction between 
the two parties but instead was an action to determine the priority ofliens the individual parties each 
filed on the same property. Hopkins, 151 Idaho at 742-43. Thus, this Court held that there was no 
commercial transaction between the parties. Id. at 748. Such is not the case in the present matter 
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as Intennountain alleged a commercial transaction with Draw, including breach of contract, open 
account, and unjust enrichment. 
In BECO, the complaint alleged breach of contract, negligence, and intentional interference 
with contract between BECO and J-U-B Engineers. BECO, 145 Idaho at 722. BECO ultimately 
withdrew its claim for breach of contract. Id. This Court held the following with respect to attorney 
fees: 
I.C. § 12-120(3) compels an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party in any civil 
action to recover on a contract for services or "in any commercial transaction." I.e. 
§ 12-120(3). \Vhen this action was initiated, BECO asserted a breach of contract 
claim against J-U-B and that claim was litigated until August 15, 2005, when BECO 
dismissed the claim. BECO asserts that, at most, J-U-B is entitled to recover the $ 
33,661.92 in fees that were incurred to this point in defending the action. However, 
BECO asserts there was neither a contract claim nor a commercial transaction that 
would support a fee award under I.C. § 12-120(3) after that point in the litigation. 
BECO claims there was no commercial transaction between these parties. The case 
at bar clearly involved a "commercial transaction" within the meaning of I.e. § 
12-120(3), but the transaction was between the City and BECO and not between 
J-U-B and BECO. J-U-B was acting as the City's agent in the transaction but there 
was no commercial relationship between J-U-B and BECO. Therefore, I.e. § 
12-120(3) does not provide the basis for a fee award to J -U-B after the point where 
the contractual claim was dismissed. Up to that point, J-U-B is entitled to its fees 
for defending against the contract claim. After that point, J-U-B is not entitled to 
its fees because there is no commercial transaction between the parties. The fact that 
J-U-B may have been the City's agent is not sufficient to establish an independent 
commercial transaction between J-U-B and BECO. We therefore vacate the fee 
award and remand this case for detennination and award ofthe amount offees J-U-B 
incurred defending BECO's contract claim. 
Id. at 726 (emphasis added). 
The BECO case support's Draw's case for fees. While there was actually no commercial 
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tra.l1saction between BECO and J-U-B, BECO had alleged the existence of a commercial transaction 
between the two. BECO eventually dismissed the claim that encompassed the commercial 
transaction. However, this Court upheld the fee award up to the time that BECO dismissed its 
breach of contract claim, despite the fact that there was no actual commercial transaction or contract 
between BECO and J-U-B. 
This Court's decision to uphold the fee award in BECO is instructive as the present case is 
similar. Here, the district court found that there was no contract or commercial transaction between 
Draw and TMC, Taggart, or Allen. However,just as in BECO, Intermountain alleged a contract and 
commercial transaction existed between Draw and TMC, Just as this Court found the award in 
BECO to be proper based on the allegation of a commercial transaction despite the fact that no 
contract or transaction existed between the parties, the district court's decision to award fees to Draw 
in this case was proper. The Court should therefore affirm the district court's award offees to Draw. 
D. APPELLA}.JT INTERMOlJNT AIN IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES ON 
APPEAL. 
Intermountain requests attorney fe_es on appeal. It requests fees "in accordance with LA.R. 
41 and 35(b)(5)." Appellant's Brief, p. 16. Pursuant to Idaho law, Intermountain failed to properly 
request fees and support the request. Intermountain is therefore not entitled to fees on appeal. 
1. Intermountain failed to properly request fees on appeal. 
LA.R. 35(a)(5) requires that "if the appellant is claiming attorney fees on appeal the 
appellant must so indicate in the division of issues on appeal that appellant is claiming attorney 
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fees and state the basis of the claim." LAR. 3 5( a)( 5) (emphasis added). Intermountain failed to 
include its request for fees in its issues presented on appeal section. See Appellant's Brief, p. 5. 
Intermountain's failure prevents this Court from awarding Intermountain fees on appeal. As this 
Court stated in Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates, L.L.C, 140 Idaho 354 (2004): 
LA.R. 41 requires that the request for attorney fees on appeal be made in the first 
brief from the respective party. I.A.R. 35(a)(5) and (6) also require that the 
requesting party put the request for fees in a separate section after the issues 
presented section and the request be discussed in the argument section. 
Id. at 365 (emphasis added); 
In Cammer. Ventures, Inc. v. Rex M & Lynn Lea Family Trust, 145 Idaho 208 (2008) this 
Court stated that I.A.R. 35(b)(5) "merely requires that a party indicate in the 'Issues on Appeal' 
section of its brief that it seeks attorney fees." Id. at 219. Intermountain failed to indicate that it was 
requesting attorney fees on appeal in the issues presented section and is therefore not entitled to fees. 
2. Intermountain failed to properly support its request for fees on appeal. 
Intermountain is also not entitled to attorney fees on appeal because it failed to support its 
request with propositions of law, authority or argument. 
Where a party requesting attorney fees on appeal cites the applicable statute but 
does not present argument in compliance with I.A.R. 35(b)( 6), this Court will 
not address the request. Carl H Christensen Family Trust v. Christensen, 133 
Idaho 866, 874, 993 P.2d 1197, 1205 (1999). Under LA.R 35(b)(6), the argument 
portion of the respondent's brief"shall contain the contentions of the respondent with 
respect to the issues presented on appeal, the reasons therefor, with citations to the 
authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript and record relied upon." LA.R. 
35(b)(6). 
Goldman v. Graham, 139 Idaho 945, 947 (2004) (emphasis added). 
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Merely citing LA.R. 41 and 3 5(b)( 5) is insufficient for this COlli"1: to consider a fee request 
on appeal: 
[NJeither [LA.R. Rule 3 5(b)( 5) or Rule 41] provide a mechanism by which this Court 
can award attorney fees. Rule 35(b)(5) merely requires that a party indicate in the 
"Issues on Appeal" section of its brief that it seeks attorney fees. As we have held 
numerous times, Rule 41 provides the procedure for requesting attorney fees on 
appeal, but is not authority alone for awarding fees. See e.g. Goodman v. Lothrop, 
143 Idaho 622, 628, 151 P .3d 818, 824 (2007). 
Commer. Ventures, Inc., 145 Idaho at 219. 
This Court has repeatedly enforced this rule. In State v. Daicel Chem. Indus., Ltd., 141 Idaho 
102 (2005), this Court denied attorney fees to a respondent who requested fees but only referred the 
court to LA.R. 41, stating: 
We have repeatedly held that a reference to Rule 41 is not sufficient by itselfto 
properly request an award of attorney fees on appeal. Bream v. Benscoter, l39 
Idaho 364, 79 P.3d 723 (2003). The requesting party must point to a statute or 
contractual provision authorizing such award. 
Id. at 109 (emphasis added). 
In Parkside Sch., Inc. v. Bronco Elite Arts & Ath., LLC, 145 Idaho 176 (2008), this Court 
again denied a request for fees, stating: 
Bronco Elite seeks attorney fees on appeal under LA.R. 41(a). However, it neither 
submits legal argument in support of its request, nor specifies the statute or 
contractual provision pursuant to which an award of fees would be available. 
"As we have long held and oft repeated, Idaho Appellate Rule 41 does not provide 
an independent basis for attorney fees on appeal because it is a procedural rule. Ater 
v.Idaho Bureau of Occupational Licenses, 144 Idaho 281,286,144 Idaho 281, 160 
P.3d 438, 443 (2007). Therefore, fees are denied. 
Id. at 179 (emphasis added); see also Dominguez v. Evergreen Res., Inc., 142 Idaho 7 (2005) 
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(holding that because of failure to cite to appropriate authority, fees not granted on appeal). 
Intermountain failed to include its request for attorney fees on appeal in the issues on appeal 
section of its brief. Further, Intermountain's request for fees merely cites I.A.R. 41 and 35(b)(5) and 
fails to cite to a statute or contractual provision authorizing such an award. Pursuant to Idaho law, 
Intermountain's request for fees on appeal should be denied. 
E. DRA W IS ENTITLED TO COSTS AND FEES ON APPEAL UNDER I.e. § 12-
120(3). 
In order for a prevailing party to receive an award of fees and costs, such an award must be 
provided for by a statute or contract. I.C. § 12-120(3) provides for an award of attorney fees in this 
case. It states: 
Id. 
In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, note, bill, 
negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of goods, 
wares, merchandise, or services and in any commercial transaction unless otherwise 
provided by law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to 
be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs. 
The term "commercial transaction" is defined to mean all transactions except 
transactions for personal or household pLLrposes. The term "party" is defined to mean 
any person, partnership, corporation, association, private organization, the state of 
Idaho or political subdivision thereof. 
1. Draw is entitled to fees on appeal under the commercial transaction prong 
afle § 12-120(3) 
I. C. § 12-120(3) provides for fees in "any commercial transaction." Commercial transaction 
is defined as "all transactions except transactions for personal or household purposes." In its 
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complaint, Intermountain alleged the existence of a commercial transaction. Intermountain's claims 
against Draw were based entirely upon Draw allegedly entering into a transaction with TMC for 
paving services. This undoubtedly qualifies as Intermountain's attempt to recover based upon a 
commercial transaction. 
The commercial transaction must also constitute the gravamen of the lawsuit. In Brower v. 
E.I DuPont, 117 Idaho 780 (1990), the Supreme Court held: 
the award of attorney's fees is not warranted every time a commercial transaction is 
remotely connected with the case. Rather, the test is whether the commercial 
transaction comprises the gravamen of the lawsuit. Attorney's fees are not 
appropriate under I. C. § 12-120(3) unless the commercial transaction is integral to 
the claim, and constitutes the basis upon which the party is attempting to 
recover. To hold otherwise would be to convert the award of attorney's fees from an 
exceptional remedy justified only by statutory authority to a matter of right in 
virtually every lawsuit filed. 
Brower, 117 Idaho at 784 (emphasis added); see Blimka v. _My Web TiVholesaler, 143 Idaho 723, 728-
29 (2007). 
The commercial transaction (the paving services) comprised the gravamen of Intermountain' s 
lawsuit and constitutes the basis upon which Intermountain attempted to recover on all its claims. 
All four ofIntermountain's claims in its Amended Complaint - breach of contract, open account, 
unjust enrichment, and lien foreclosure - arise out of TMC allegedly providing paving services for 
Draw. Without the alleged commercial transaction between Draw and TMC, Intermountain could 
not have brought a breach of contract or open account claim and could not have alleged that Draw 
had been unjustly enriched. Further, TMC's lien was filed based upon the performance of the paving 
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services and lntennountain sought to foreclose the lien based upon those same paving services. 
In sum, Intennountain could not have proceeded with or recovered on any of its claims 
without alleging that Draw contracted for or was somehow involved in a commercial transaction 
with TMC. Thus, the alleged commercial transaction between Draw and TMC for paving services 
was integral and indispensable to Intennountain' s claims and therefore was the gravamen of 
Intennountain's lawsuit. 
2. Draw is entitled to recoverfees under the contract prong of 1. C. § J 2-J 20(3). 
It is unassailable that Intennountain alleged in its complaint that a contract between 
lntennountain and Draw existed and that Draw breached that contract. The case law could not be 
clearer that' [w]here a party alleges the existence of a contractual relationship of a type embraced 
by section 12-120(3) ... that claim triggers the application of [I.C. § 12-120(3)] and a prevailing 
party may recover fees even though no liability under a contract was established." Farmers Nat. 
Bank v. Shirey, 126 Idaho 63, 73 (1994). 
A commercial transaction is not required when recovery is sought on the basis of a contract 
as Idaho Code § 12-120(3) "provides for the recovery of attorney fees incurred in litigation based 
upon any contract." Id. (emphasis added). "Idaho Code § 12-120(3) provides for an award of 
reasonable attorney fees 'in any civil action to recover ... on [a] contract relating to ... services.'" 
Noak v. Idaho Dep 't ofCorr., 271 P.3d 703, 711 (Idaho 2012) (quoting I.C. § 12-120(3)). 
Intennountain alleged the existence of a contractual relationship of a type embraced by I.C. 
§ 12-120(3). Therefore, Draw is entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs on appeal under the 
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contract prong ofI.C. § 12-120(3) should it prevail against Intennountain's appeaL 
3. Draw is entitled to fees under the open account prong of Ie § 12-120(3). 
Further, Intennountain brought a claim to recover on an open account. Similar to a claim on 
a contract, § 12-120(3) provides for an award of fees "in any civil action to recover on an open 
account." I.C § 12-120(3) (emphasis added). Thus, the action for an open account does not have 
to be based upon a commercial transaction in order to get an award of fees. An action for an open 
account in a civil action is all that is required. 
Intennountain sought to recover from Draw on a claim for open account. Therefore, Draw 
is entitled to an award of attorney fees under the open account prong of I.C. § 12-120(3). 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Intennountain waived its contention that the district court failed to properly apply the 
language of I.C § 45-501 when it failed to include it as an issue on appeal pursuant to LA.R. 
35(a)(4). Nonetheless, the district court did not disregard the testimony of Robert Butler, but 
analyzed the facts under the assumption that Draw's property was within Taylorview Development. 
The district court correctly applied the language ofLC § 45-501 and deternlined that there was no 
evidence of agency between Draw and Taggart and/or Allen. Consequently, the district court's 
decision granting Draw summary judgment was correct and this Court should affinn the same. 
The gravamen oflntennountain's Complaint was the paving services TMC provided. This 
is clearly a commercial transaction which Intennountain alleged was between Draw and TMC 
through an agency relationship. As a result, the district court's decision granting Draw partial 
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attorney fees under I.e. § 12-120(3) was correct. This Court should affirm the district court's 
decision and also award Draw attorney fees and costs on appeal should it prevail on appeal. 
Intermountain failed to properly request and support its request for costs and fees on appeal and this 
Court should therefore deny Intermountain's request should it prevail on appeal. 
DATED this \ L{ day of January, 2013. 
THOMSEN STEPHENS OFFICES, PLLC 
By: 
I Ribhard R. Friess, Esq. 
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